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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION
AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENTAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Michael Perino
I. INTRODUCTION
Sitting on a leather chair in front of the deep blue banner of the
Commonwealth Club of California, then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi laid
out her vision for how the country should proceed in the aftermath of the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression. The country, she said in April 2009,
was angry at the financial industry and angry that the federal government had
stepped in to bail out firms that were deemed too big to fail. Seventy-five
percent of the country, she contended, wanted an investigation "to find out what
happened on Wall Street." Pelosi vowed to give the country just that. When she
returned to Washington, Pelosi would propose legislation to create a new "Pecora
Commission," which, she explained, was an independent "commission formed
when Franklin Roosevelt became president."' In May 2009, a month after
Pelosi's speech, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
("FERA"), which, among other things, created the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (the "FCIC" or the "Commission"), an independent, bipartisan
panel tasked to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial
and economic crisis in the United States."2
Nancy Pelosi's history was not quite right. Franklin Roosevelt never
created an independent commission to investigate Wall Street, although it is
difficult to criticize her too harshly for that historical error. Ferdinand Pecora is,
after all, hardly a household name today.4 Nearly 80 years ago, however, it was a
different story. The Pecora hearings, the eponymous investigation of Wall Street
wrongdoing run by this former New York prosecutor turned Senate inquisitor,
captivated the country.5 For sixteen months in the worst depths of the Great
Depression, Pecora paraded a series of elite financiers before the Senate Banking

. Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, St.
John's University School of Law. Subject to the usual caveats, the author would like to thank June
Carbone and Bill Black for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Pelosi Calls for Investigation of Economic Crisis, YouTUBE (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-lj64-PuAk9U.
2 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat. 1617, 1625
(2009).
Neither was her reporting of current events-by April 2009 there were already several proposals
to create a commission to investigate the financial crisis. See, e.g., S. 298, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (bill offered by Senators Isakson, Conrad, and Chambliss to create a Financial Markets
Commission). See infra note 91.
4 The hearings are so little known today that one modem writer (no doubt aware of the convention
that congressional investigations typically bear the name of the senator or representative that chairs
the committee) thought that they must have been led by "Senator Ferdinand Pecora." DONALD
WARREN, RADIO PRIEST: CHARLES COUGHLIN, THE FATHER OF HATE RADIO 56 (1996).
5 See MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: How FERDINAND PECORA'S
INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2010).
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and Currency Committee. In one dramatic hearing after another, he chronicled
how the leaders of Wall Street, men previously thought to be of "unimpeachable
integrity," had manipulated stocks, dodged taxes, fleeced their shareholders, and
collected enormous bonuses for peddling shoddy securities to unsuspecting
American investors.6
The sensational headlines galvanized public opinion for reform and
created the climate in which Congress was able to re-shape and, in some
instances create, much of the modem structure of federal financial regulation. In
the first hundred days of Roosevelt's administration, Congress passed the
Banking Act of 1933,7 better known for its co-sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and
Representative Henry Steagall. Glass-Steagall not only separated commercial
from investment banking, but also created federal deposit insurance, perhaps the
most important structural change to banking regulation to emerge from the New
Deal.8 A few weeks earlier, Congress had passed the Securities Act of 1933, the
first federal law to regulate the sale of securities to investors.9 A year later came
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which regulated the stock markets, created
a system of periodic disclosure for public companies, and established the
Securities and Exchange Commission.o
The drafters of those laws were candid in their gratitude for Pecora's
meticulous and sensational investigation. "We built completely on his work,"
acknowledged James M. Landis, the Harvard Law professor who had a major
Even Roosevelt drew a direct link
hand in writing both securities laws."

See FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY
CHANGERS (1939).
Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1933).
8 MiLToN FRIEDMAN AND ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867-1960 434-442 (1963). Congress repealed the restrictions separating commercial
from investment banking in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act passed in 1999. 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(2006). Although deposit insurance has played such an important role in the stability of the
banking system, it is notable because it was one of the few financial reforms not originally
supported by the Roosevelt administration. From the banking panic of 1893 through 1933, 150
bills seeking to introduce some form of federal deposit insurance were introduced; they all failed.
See generally Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit InsuranceLegislation of 1933: An Examination of
Its Antecedents and Its Purposes,75 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1960). Roosevelt, mirroring the objections
of large, urban banks, argued that deposit insurance would cause strong banks to subsidize small,
weak ones, creating disincentives to prudent management. He also thought that deposit insurance
opened the federal government to potentially huge losses, and he threatened to veto any banking
bill that contained deposit insurance. See THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, vol. 2 37 (Samuel L. Roseman, ed., 1938). Steagall was one of the strongest
proponents of the proposal and he capitalized on the political pressure for deposit insurance in the
wake of the Pecora hearings and the banking crisis to push for its inclusion in the final bill. See
Eugene Nelson White, Deposit Insurance, in REFORMING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: HISTORICAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 85 (Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Dimitri Vittas, eds., 1997). Deposit insurance,
therefore, was a prime example of the power the Pecora hearings had to shape legislative outcomes.
9 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
1o Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
1Reminiscences ofJames McCauley Landis (1964), in ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION OF COLUMBIA
6

UNIVERSITY 199.
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between the wrongdoing Pecora uncovered and his ability to push through reform
legislation.12 The investigation surely ranks among the most successful
congressional inquiries in the more than 200 year history of such probes.
Coming anywhere close was a tall order, but initially there was hope that
the FCIC could replicate at least some of the success Pecora enjoyed. When he
was selected to chair the Commission in July 2009, former California Treasurer
Phil Angelides said that his goal, like Pecora's, was to "deepen the national
dialogue about the need and the shape of reform."1 3 Angelides claimed that he
kept a copy of Pecora's memoirs, a book called Wall Street under Oath, on his
bedside table and he was forthright in his ambition for the Commission.14 The
FCIC's task, he said, was no less than "writing the official history of what
brought our financial and economic system to its knees." 15
Now, more than a year after the FCIC released its final report, it is clear
that the Commission did not live up to either Angelides's aspirations or the
legacy of its Depression-era predecessor. During the course of its investigation
critics derided the hearings as "nearly universally boring and bereft of new
After just a few months, critics were ready to write off the
information."
enterprise. "Let's be realistic here," wrote Wall Street Journal columnist
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., "in the time available to the panel, given its make-up,
and given [Vice Chairman Bill] Thomas's descent into popinjayism, there's little
chance that somebody with an interesting mind will take control and issue a
report that's anything more than a distillation of well-worn motifs already in the
media, adding nothing illuminating to the history of this episode." 17 Former New
York governor Eliot Spitzer bluntly called the entire effort "a waste."1 8
In some respects, these assessments are hard to refute, particularly in
light of the Pecora investigation's legislative successes. The FCIC investigation
had no discernable influence over the shape of and prospects for financial reform.
Its work proceeded along an entirely different track than the efforts that led to the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed in 2010
(Dodd-Frank).19 It was not until six months after Dodd-Frank was enacted that
the FCIC released its report on the causes of the financial crisis.

12PERNO, supra note 5, at 5.

13Greg Kaufmann, FinancialCrisis Inquiry Kicks into High Gear, THE NATION, Nov. 16, 2009,
availableat http://www.thenation.com/article/financial-crisis-inquiry-kicks-high-gear.
14Michael Hirsh, Last Chancefor Justice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 2009.
15Kaufmann, supranote 13.
16Charles Gasparino, Is The FinancialCrisis Inquiry Commission Wimping Out on JP Morgan?,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlesfasparino/how-the-financial-crisis b_631361.html.
Hollman W. Jenkins Jr., Incurious Inquiry: Was There Anything Useful Learned From Last
Week's Hearingof the FinancialCrisisInquiry Commission?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,2010, at Al 9.
18Eliot Spitzer, Two Disgraceful Failures: How Congress and the Financial Crisis Inquiry are
Botching Their Only Chance to Reform Wall Street, SLATE (Apr. 13, 2010, 3:20 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/the-best_policy/2010/04/two-disgraceful-failures
.html.
19 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012).
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In the waning months of the investigation, the FCIC was wracked with
controversy and dissension. Indeed, by the summer of 2010 it looked like the
There was a raft of resignations from the
FCIC was self-destructing.
Commission staff.20 A member of the House of Representatives announced that
he was launching an investigation of the investigators because he believed that
the FCIC was rife with conflicts, partisanship, and waste. Chairman Angelides
was forced to ask Congress for additional money to complete the investigation.
The FCIC announced in late 2010 that it would not meet its December 15, 2010
deadline and that it would not release its report until late January 2011. The
commissioners split along partisan lines over this announcement, unable to agree
that more time was necessary or that it was appropriate for the FCIC to miss its
statutory deadline.21
A month before the report was released, word leaked out that Republican
commissioners were arguing that the words "Wall Street," "deregulation," and
"shadow banking system," should be excised from the report.22 Republican vice
chairman Bill Thomas complained that the Democrats were preparing a "hit
piece" on Wall Street banks. When the report was finally released on January
27, 2011,24 it proved to be a good deal less than the official history of the
financial crisis. The ten commissioners had managed to write three different
reports explaining what caused it. In the face of those competing narratives, it
was all too easy for commentators and Congress to write off the FCIC as just
another example of the climate of hyper-partisanship in Washington. 25
I have discussed in cursory form elsewhere why the Pecora investigation
and the FCIC had such disparate results.26 This article attempts a somewhat
deeper analysis that compares the politics that underlay the FCIC investigation
with those not only of the Pecora investigation but with those of what is generally

20 Sewell Chan & Eric Dash, Internal Dissent and StaffLosses May Hurt Financial
Crisis Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at Bl.
21
22

Sewell Chan, FinancialCrisisPanel to Delay Report, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at B4.
Felix Salmon, The FCIC Falls Apart, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-

salmon/2010/12/15/the-fcic-falls-apart/.
23 John D. McKinnon, PartisanRancor UndercutsProbe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2011,
at A4.
24 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE

STATES
(2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcicreports/feicfinal report full.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
25 See, e.g., FinalReport of the FinancialCrisis Inquiry Commission, Hearing before the H. Comm.
available at
112-6 (2011),
1st Sess.
112th Cong.,
on Financial Services,
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/l 12-6.pdf (Statement of Rep. Patrick T. McHenry
(R-NC)) ("The fact that 3 different opinions have emerged from a body of only 10 Commissioners
brings into question the objectivity of the majority report.") [hereinafter House Hearing].
26 See Michael Perino, How the FCIC Can Salvage its Relevancy, CNNMONEY (Nov. 2, 2010,
12:46 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2010/11/02/how-the-feic-can-salvage-its-relevancy/;
Michael Perino, Lessonsfrom Pecora Were Ignored,N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 14, 2010, 11:05
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/another-view-lessons-from-pecora-wereAM),
ignored/?scp=1&sq=perino%20pecora&st-csehttp://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/anotherview-lessons-from-pecora-were-ignored/?scp=1&sq=perino%20pecora&stacse.
UNITED
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perceived as a more successful independent commission-the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (better known as the
9/11 Commission). Although the FCIC is most frequently compared to the
former, the comparison to the latter is more apt. When Congress created the
FCIC it rejected proposals to conduct a congressional investigation more in line
with the Pecora investigation and instead chose to model the FCIC explicitly on
the 9/11 Commission.
This paper highlights two reasons why the FCIC was not the Pecora
investigation redux and why it failed to achieve the same consensus as the 9/11
Commission. The first explanation involves how the goals for these different
investigations were defined. As explained in more detail in Section II, the Pecora
investigation appears to have represented an innovative and novel application of
congressional investigatory power. Available evidence suggests that before the
Pecora investigation, congressional inquiries were generally thought to serve two
broad goals: (1) checking executive branch abuse or ferreting out executive
corruption or (2) providing a means for Congress to investigate conditions in
areas in which it was seeking to legislate. In both situations, investigations often
had a public informing function-achieving, for example, partisan political
advantage through exposure of executive misfeasance or malfeasance or simply
making the case that a contemplated legislative program was warranted. Before
the New Deal, the driving force behind those investigatory efforts was internal,
emanating from members of Congress.
While the Pecora probe was ostensibly designed to investigate conditions
in the securities markets in preparation for potential legislation, it differed from
prior congressional efforts because its motivation was external to the legislature.
Originally proposed by the Hoover administration, the main thrust of the
investigation was backed primarily by the Roosevelt administration as a way to
create public support for its legislative program. Although such a purpose seems
commonplace now, no president before Roosevelt apparently used Congress's
investigatory power in quite this way. It worked beautifully. Capitalizing on the
banking crisis facing the country and on Pecora's formidable courtroom skills,
Roosevelt was able to channel the broad public anger at the financial community
into a clamor for reform that eased passage of his proposals through Congress.
The FCIC's purpose was far less clear. The statute was straightforward-like the 9/11 Commission, the FCIC was supposed to analyze the
causes of a national crisis. During the course of the investigation, however, the
commissioners and outside commentators offered several other explanations for
what the Commission was supposed to accomplish. Some pitched it as a latterday Pecora investigation, intended to build the public case for reform and to hold
bankers accountable for the country's economic straits. Others suggested that the
FCIC was meant to collect the data Congress needed to shape financial reform
legislation, even though work on that legislation was already well advanced when
the FCIC finally got up and running. In some cases, commissioners espoused
multiple goals at the same time. With this confusion over the FCIC's function
and with commissioners often working at cross purposes, it was no wonder the
effort foundered.
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The second reason why the FCIC hearings never looked like the Pecora
hearings was because the former's design and structure bore absolutely no
resemblance to the latter. Rather than being an investigation by a standing
congressional committee subject to the near dictatorial control of the committee's
chair, the FCIC was an independent, bipartisan commission that needed
consensus to operate effectively. As explained in Section III, the FCIC was
subject to the same limitations and political pressures that beset the 9/11
Commission's investigation. Both commissions faced numerous obstacles to
conducting vigorous investigations: the partisan selection of commissioners
combined with broad commission mandates, woefully small budgets, short time
frames for conducting their investigations, and weak subpoena powers. The 9/11
Commission's chairman, former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, went so far
as to argue that his commission was designed to fail.27 The fact that the 9/11
Commission did not devolve into partisan sniping was the product of Kean's
ability to promote a nonpartisan atmosphere on the commission and of the high
cost of politicizing the investigation into the September 11 attack. While little
has been disclosed about the inner workings of the FCIC, an analysis of what is
available and of the literature on the 9/11 Commission shows why the FCIC was
never able to achieve a similar d6tente among its ideologically opposed members.
II. THE PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
Congressional investigations have multiple purposes, from the mundane
to the malicious. They can involve everything from routine fact-finding and
petty publicity seeking to spectacular political theater that unalterably changes
the course of the nation. Independent commissions also have multiple purposes,
although very rarely are they designed to build that kind of public clamor.
Particularly in the context of commissions instigated in the wake of a crisis, they
are often charged with finding, theoretically in a nonpartisan setting, the causes
for that crisis. Such investigations are typically portrayed as dispassionate postmortems that address questions so important that they stand apart from the
normal political processes. In many cases, however, this investigatory function
appears to be more symbolic than real and far from nonpartisan. Forming a
commission is a tangible manifestation that the government is concerned about a
problem, even if, as is often true, the results of the investigation are never
expected to inform future legislation.

27

Mike Kelly, Kean: Some Wanted 9/11 Panelto Fail,THE RECORD, July 20, 2004, at Al.
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A. Congressional Investigations
1. A Brief Overview of Congressional Investigations before the Pecora
Hearings
Prior to the Pecora investigation, congressional probes were thought to
have one of two primary goals. The first, and for most commentators the most
important, was to act as a check on executive abuses or to root out executive
corruption. Woodrow Wilson, writing in the late 1800s, saw "vigilant oversight
of administration" as even more important than Congress's legislative function.
Congress acted as "the eyes and voice" of the country. For Wilson, "the only
really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its
administration." 28
This kind of executive oversight already had a long history by 1933. Its
origins lay in the British parliamentary system, with examples of legislative
oversight of the administration of government going back as far as the
seventeenth century.29 Many of these early investigations had a decidedly
modem cast. Often they were tied to parliamentary power over appropriations
and they involved matters as diverse as the scandals involving the administration
of relief to the poor and improprieties in the operation of the East India
Company.3 0 In 1861, John Stuart Mill, like Wilson twenty years later in the
United States, stressed the importance of these investigatory efforts. "The proper
office of a representative assembly," he argued, "is to watch and control the
government." 3 Indeed, Wilson mimicked Mills's assessment of the relative
importance of investigation and legislation. For Mills, the legislature's most
important function was "to throw the light of publicity on [the government's]
acts." The legislature needed to be able to "compel a full exposition and
justification" for any governmental acts it considered questionable and to
"censure" and "expel" governmental officials who abused their trust or "acted in
a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation.', 32 Implicit in
this function was the idea that control required the legislature to inform the
populace when the executive overstepped its proper bounds.
The nascent United States copied this model of legislative oversight of
the executive. Legislatures in the pre-Constitutional United States conducted
probes of potential executive wrongdoing. In 1792, Congress authorized an
investigation of Major General Arthur St. Clair's defeat at the hands of Indian

See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
198 (Meridian Books 1956) (1885).

28

GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 195,

29 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Introduction in CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED

HISTORY 1792-1974 xviii-xix (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns, eds., 1975).
30 See MARSHALL E. DIMOCK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES 49-52 (1929); James

M. Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations of the CongressionalPower of Investigation, 40 HARv. L.
REV. 153, 162-64 (1926).
31 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 104 (1861).
32

Id.
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tribes in the Ohio Valley.33 From there, Congress's investigations were wideranging. The first few decades of the nineteenth century saw congressional
investigations involving, among other things, whether the Commander in Chief
of the United States Army, James Wilkinson, had pledged his allegiance to and
was being paid by the Spanish government, the burning of the District of
Columbia in the War of 1812, and the operation of the Second Bank of the
United States.34 Later Congresses tackled administrative abuses and corporate
and political corruption. 35 All told, by the late 1920s, Congress had conducted
around 300 different investigations; by one count two-thirds of those involved
some sort of executive oversight.
In McGrain v. Dougherty, a case that arose out of Congress's
investigation of the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s, the Supreme Court relied
on this long history in holding that "the power of inquiry-with process to
enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."
From those early investigations, through Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra,
and the myriad Clinton-era probes, Congress has used and abused its
investigatory power to oversee the executive branch or simply to achieve partisan
Frequently these were
political advantage or personal aggrandizementi

n Schlesinger & Bruns, supra note 29, at 3-101.
34 See generallyid. at 105-331, 591-685,
3 For example, in 1873 Congress investigated the Credit Mobilier scandal. Credit Mobilier of
America was a corporation used to finance construction of the transcontinental Union Pacific
Railroad. Massachusetts Representative Oakes Ames, a Credit Mobilier shareholder, and
promoters of the Union Pacific were accused of selling Credit Mobilier stock at bargain prices to
United States vice president Schuyler Colfax, the secretary of the treasury, the Speaker of the
House, and a dozen members of Congress, including future president James A. Garfield. See W.
Allan Wilbur, The Credit Mobilier Scandal 1873 in Schlesinger & Bruns, supra note 29, at 184963.
36 DIMOCK, supra note 30, at 57, 87.
37 McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927). On this history, the Court noted that
investigations were "employed in American legislatures before the Constitution was framed and
ratified" and that early Congresses, whose members included some of the framers, similarly
authorized investigations. "A long-continued practical construction by Congress of powers under
provisions of the Constitution should be taken as fixing the meaning of such provisions." Id. at
174.
Three years earlier, Felix Frankfurter, then still a Harvard law professor, quoted Woodrow Wilson
in opining that investigating the executive branch of government was one of Congress's "basic
duties." Felix Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigation, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 21, 1924, 330.
That defense of congressional investigatory prerogatives came in the midst of enormous pressure to
rein in those powers. Id. at 329 (noting that as the Teapot Dome investigation progressed "every
influence of authority, of powerful social connections, of the press, the whole milieu of officialdom
in Washington was on the side of those in power and against disclosure and truth-telling.").
38 BENJAMIN

GINSBURG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: THE DECLINING

IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS IN AMERICA 26-31 (1990); Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler,
Investigating the President: Committee Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953-2006 (2011).
APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-1900886, at 6-7.
Although there appeared to be some uncertainty with respect to the issue, prior to the Pecora
investigation Congress's power to oversee the executive included the power to oversee
administration agencies. DIMOCK, supra note 30, at 21-26.
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attempts to shape public opinion against the president or the party in power.
The audience, in other words, was primarily an external one.40
The second rationale for congressional investigatory power is to enable
Congress to determine existing conditions so that it may legislate intelligently. 4 1
"A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively," the Supreme Court
noted in McGrain in affirming broad, but not unlimited powers of congressional
investigation, "in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information-which not infrequently is truerecourse must be had to others who do possess it."" 2 The "power of inquiry"
was "necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate." 3 As with
investigations of the executive, this kind of fact finding often has an auxiliary
public function. Legislators conducting hearings often attempted to mold public
opinion in support of the policies they favored."
2. The Pecora Investigation
At first glance, the Pecora investigation would appear to be an
investigation in contemplation of proposed legislation. The original resolution
authorizing the investigation called for a broad inquiry into stock exchange
practices and required a report back to the full Senate "as soon as practicable.',4
In its report, the Banking and Currency Committee was directed that "if in its
judgment such practices should be regulated, to submit with such report its
When the
recommendations for the necessary remedial legislation." 46

See DIMOCK, supra note 30, at 15.
One type of investigation that has an internal focus is when Congress investigates its own
members. In such an investigation, Congress might seek to determine whether an individual
satisfies the requirements for sitting in that body. More commonly, Congress might seek to
determine whether one of its members should be punished for violating congressional rules or for
some other misconduct. See id. at 15.
41M. Nelson McGeary, CongressionalInvestigations: HistoricalDevelopment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv.
425, 426-27 (1951).
42 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174-75.
'

40

43 id

4 DIMOCK, supranote 30, at 15.
45 S. Res. 84, 72d Cong (1932) (directing the Committee on Banking and Currency "to make a
thorough and complete investigation of the practices with respect to the buying and selling and the
borrowing and lending of listed securities upon the various stock exchanges, the values of such
securities, and the effect of such practices upon interstate and foreign commerce, upon the
operation of the national banking system and the Federal reserve system, and upon the market for
securities of the United States Government, and the desirability of the exercise of the taxing power
of the United States with respect to any such securities . . . "), available at
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/pdf/Pecora SenRes84.pdf.
46 Id. Interestingly, the historical record shows that the impetus for the investigation was not in
contemplation of potential legislation. At several points in the days surrounding adoption of the
resolution, Senator Frederic Walcott, a member of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
who was one of the leading proponents of an investigation, disclaimed any interest in legislation.
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investigation was extended into the next Congress, it was again in contemplation
of potential legislation. 47
While the investigation appeared to be a conventional legislative factfinding exercise and while much of the wrongdoing uncovered in the Pecora
investigation was reflected in the New Deal's financial reform legislation, in
reality the inquiry (at least after Roosevelt assumed office) was not intended to
provide Congress with the raw data it needed to shape those bills. The Pecora
investigation was innovative because it involved a third use of congressional
When Woodrow Wilson wrote that legislative
investigatory power.
investigations should be for "the enlightenment of the people," he was concerned
with revelation of executive abuses by Congress. Most of the investigations in
the decade prior to the Pecora hearings involved allegations of this kind of
executive misconduct.48 Franklin Roosevelt turned that power on its head. His
forceful, behind the scenes orchestration and vigorous public backing of the
Pecora investigation was intended to win public support for his reform agenda.4 9
Pecora's job, in short, was to create a groundswell of support for the financial
reforms the new administration would offer. This was not an investigation of the
executive branch; this was an investigation in support of the executive branch.
The cornerstone of that effort was the public hearing, in which Pecora
would grill bankers for the benefit of the assembled reporters. It was political
theater, to be sure, but it was also effective. Having Pecora uncover Wall
Street's sins in this dramatic fashion, Roosevelt knew, would ease passage of the
kind of reform legislation that would, under normal circumstances, succumb to
special interest wrangling. Even though the Democrats controlled Congess,
As
there were still ample opportunities to filibuster legislation in the Senate.
Benjamin Cohen, a lawyer and one of the primary architects of the federal

"There is no intention," he told reporters, "to seek legislation interfering with the regular operations
of the stock exchanges." Targetfor Blunderbuss, TIME, Mar. 14, 1932, at 53.
47 When Senator Edward Costigan proposed extending the investigation, he pointed to the
disclosures that had already emerged from the investigation and their potential for reform
legislation. "[The Committee's] disclosures, and legislative remedies which may naturally be
expected to flow from the testimony being taken, are justly attracting nation-wide attention. It is
assumed that no Member of the Senate will desire to interfere with that highly important
investigation at a time when general public agreement is being expressed on the overwhelming
necessity for remedial enactments by Congress to guard, so far as humanly possible, against the
recurrence of such conditions as have been and are being revealed by the testimony." 76 CONG.
REc. 5,212 (1933).
48 See M. Nelson McGeary, CongressionalInvestigations during Franklin D. Roosevelt's First
Term, 31 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 680, 680 (1937).
49 See M. NELSON, McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENTS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER 39

(1966) ("Experience under the New Deal-when in direct contrast to the previous decade, a strong
majority, Presidentially led, was committed to a program of social change-showed a development
of this legislative-Administrative collaboration to a degree perhaps unprecedented.").
50 At that time, a cloture vote on a filibuster required a two-thirds vote, not the 60 percent now
required. Indeed, in the lame duck session of Congress that had just ended, Louisiana Senator
Huey Long had just led a successful filibuster to defeat passage of an earlier version of GlassSteagall. PERINO, supra note 5, at 64-69.
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securities laws, put it, by the time Pecora was finished the bankers "were so
discredited in the public eye that Congress was ready to pass anything." 5 '
The Pecora investigation, of course, was not the first time a president had
urged congressional allies to conduct investigations. Indeed, the original impetus
for the Pecora investigation came from President Herbert Hoover. In February
1932, Hoover approached Senator Frederic Walcott, his political ally on the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, and asked him to start an investigation
of short selling. Hoover was convinced that short sellers affiliated with the
Democratic Party were planning massive bear raids that would drive down
securities prices to embarrass the administration and weaken Hoover's chances
for re-election. Hoover wanted Walcott to call short sellers to the stand in
Washington in an attempt to thwart their plans. 52
Although Hoover instituted the investigation and Roosevelt promoted its
continuation, their purposes in doing so were quite different. Hoover had a
partisan and overtly political agenda for asking Walcott to start hearings-the
president was seeking to enhance his electoral chances. Hoover had no intention
of regulating the securities markets; in fact he thought that it was unconstitutional
for the federal government to regulate the New York Stock Exchange.5 3
Roosevelt, by contrast, seemed to view the congressional investigating power
from a far more strategic perspective. Hearings were a mechanism that he (rather
than a legislator) could use to shape public opinion. In his hands, the
congressional investigation was not a tool for checking the executive but a tool
for the executive to exert control over the legislative process. By creating a
political climate in which the public demanded meaningful reform legislation,
Congress had little opportunity to thwart the administration's plans.
The Pecora investigation was the first of many investigations in the
1930s in which the administration orchestrated the hearings in order to promote
its political agenda. During Roosevelt's first term, 51 of 165 congressional
investigations (about 31 percent) have been classified as investigations aimed at
facilitating the passage of legislation the administration was seeking or
facilitating some other administrative initiative or political objective. 54 It was
then a novel approach, but it quickly became well established. Not even twenty
years after the Pecora investigation, Senator William Fulbright was able to assert
confidently that: "Sometimes the congressional investigation results only in
public disclosure-or exposure. When this is the case, the results may be
regarded as an appeal to public opinion, an invitation to the people to say
whether or not they discern the need for legislation which the legislators
themselves have not yet seen fit to enact." 55

51 D. B. HARDEMAN & DONALD C. BACON, RAYBURN: A BIOGRAPHY
52 PERINO, supra note 5, at 16-18.

154 (1987).

" Id. at 16-17.
54 McGeary, supra note 48, at 681-82.
Jj. William Fulbright, CongressionalInvestigations: Signficance for the Legislative Process, 18
U. CHI. L. REv. 441, 443-444 (1951).
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B. The FCIC and Other Independent Commissions
Since Theodore Roosevelt's administration, independent commissions
have been common in Washington, although academic work studying them
remains somewhat sparse.57 Rather than attempts to analyze the phenomenon,
most works tend to be histories of particular commissions, often by insiders,5 8
although sometimes by academics 59 or by journalists.6 0
Congress or the president may create commissions to achieve a variety of
aims. Commissions are often asked to make recommendations on topics, such as
social security or budget cuts, that are too politically charged for elected officials
to tackle directly.6 ' In these cases, commissions can be an important mechanism
for creatin cover for officials who may want to make politically unpopular
proposals. Instead of taking full responsibility for those proposals, government
officials can point to the wise counsel of independent experts to justify their
stances.63 Alternatively, commissions can be an expedient mechanism for
delaying a response to a thorny political problem.6
As with congressional investigations, independent commissions are
sometimes formed to provide data about a problem, either for public education or
to allow the relevant governmental actors to make policy proposals.65 In other

s6 DAVID FLITNER, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS 7-14 (1986). While Theodore
Roosevelt popularized commissions, examples of presidential commissions can be found as early
as the Washington administration. Id.

s7 See, e.g., Amy Zegert, Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of
PresidentialCommissions, 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 366 (2004); Colton C. Campbell, Creatingan Angel:
CongressionalDelegation to Ad Hoc Commissions, 25 CONG. & THE PREs. 161 (1998); Daniel A.
Smith, et al., Predicting the Outcomes of PresidentialCommissions: Evidence from the Johnson
andNixon Years, 28 PRES. STUD. Q. 269 (1998).
58 See generally RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: EXPOSING THE TRUTH

FROM WATERGATE TO 9/11 (2009); THOMAS H. KEAN & LEE H. HAMILTON, WITHOUT PRECEDENT:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION (2006); RICHARD FEYNMAN, WHAT Do YOU CARE
WHAT OTHER PEOPLE THINK?: FURTHER ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER (1988).
5 See PAUL LIGHT, ARTFUL WORK: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (1985); ANTHONY
M. PLATT, THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIoNS, 1917-1970 (1971); Mark Fenster, Designing

Transparency: The 9/11 Commission and Institutional Form, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1239
(2008); William E. Juhnke, President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights: The Interaction of
Politics,Protest,and PresidentialAdvisory Commission, 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 593 (1989).
60 See PHILIP SHENON, THE COMMISSION: THE UNCENSORED HISTORY OF THE 9/11 INVESTIGATION

(2008).
61 See LIGHT, supra note 59, at 163. This would include military base closure commissions and the

recent National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (the Simpson-Bowles
Commission), which formulated proposals for federal deficit reduction.
62 Campbell, supra note 57, at 162.
63 As with the recent example of the Simpson-Bowles Commission, politicians will just as
frequently distance themselves from a commission's recommendations as embrace them. Jackie

Calmes, Deficit Reduction Plan Draws Scorn From Left and Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, at
Al.
6 FLITNER, supra note 56, 25-28.
65 Id. at 20, 23, 65.
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situations, Congress may delegate to an ad hoc commission instead of conducting
an investigation itself in order to manage its own workload more effectively.6 6
This latter explanation was one of the rationales for creating the FCIC. An
outside commission, Senator Christopher Dodd argued, "is probably the best
alternative, given the magnitude of the problem that must be examined."67 It was
a job, he asserted, that was simply too big for the Senate to handle itself. Given
the work he and other Senators had to put in on drafting financial reform
legislation, it was "asking an awful lot" for them to investigate as well.68
This argument about the difficulty of undertaking an investigation while
at the same time drafting reform legislation seems a bit odd. After all, one of the
primary purposes of congressional investigations is to provide the data necessary
for Congress to formulate appropriate legislation. If anything, it would seem that
Congress would want to investigate first and legislate second. Critics of DoddFrank made a similar argument. The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a
part of the conservative American Enterprise Institute, chastised Congress for
enacting Dodd-Frank "long before the [FCIC] has concluded its hearings, much
less written its report. As a result, Congress has failed to deal with many of the
underlying causes of the crisis that the Commission is likely to identify."69
Republican critics in Congress would echo this criticism. 70
This critique, however, ignores a basic reality of major financial reform
legislation-it is almost invariably enacted in the immediate aftermath of crisis
and scandal.
Waiting until 2011 would have likely killed any attempt to pass
meaningful financial reform because, without the combination of crisis and
palpable public outrage, it is unlikely that Congress would have had the political
will to act. Moreover, the FCIC report was due after the 2010 mid-term
elections.
Those elections ultimately shifted control of the House of
Representatives from the Democrats to the Republicans. As House Republicans
sought to repeal Dodd-Frank immediately upon assuming power, it seems clear
that the legislation would never have passed if Congress waited for the FCIC to
complete its work. Opponents of financial reform may have anticipated or at
least hoped for such an electoral shift when they urged delay.
FCIC member Brooksley Born made just this point in the FCIC's first
open hearing. She urged Congress and the Obama administration to pass
financial reform quickly and specifically stated that they should not wait for the

66
67
68

Campbell, supra note 57, at 170-74.
155 CONG. REc. S4547-48 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009).
id.

69 Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Missed Opportunities in the Dodd-

Frank
Act,
Sept.
13,
2010,
available
at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/policy%20page/Statement/2ONo.%20296.pdf.
7o Shelby: In the End, the FCICDid Not Matter, FEDERAL INFORMATION AND NEWS DISPATCH, May
10, 2011.
7n Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77, 81-82 (2003); Michael Perino, Enron's
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of
2002, 76 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 671, 671-73 (2002).
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Commission to complete its work. Once the economy begins some recovery, she
warned, the urgency of serious reform will diminish.72 At the same hearing,
former Senator Bob Graham said that the FCIC should not serve as a means for
procrastinating on reform. 73 Born's and Graham's reading of the political
environment was undoubtedly correct, but it raises a significant issue-if the
FCIC investigation was not intended to provide Congress with data on the true
causes of the financial crisis, just exactly what was it supposed to do?
Sometimes, as with the 9/11 Commission and the FCIC, commissions are
created as a result of external political pressures, often in the wake of a crisis and
in response to public demand for an explanation of the causes of that crisis. In
the case of the 9/11 Commission, the pressures came from the families of the
victims of the terrorist attacks who publicly lobbied for an inquiry into
intelligence failures. 74 These kinds of crisis-oriented commissions were common
in the 1960s and 1970s, when political assassinations and civil unrest grew more
prevalent. They included the Warren Commission, the National Advisory
Commission of Civil Disorders, the National Commission on the Causes and
Preventions of Violence, and the President's Commission on Campus Unrest.7 5
For many of these commissions, there is little expectation that they will produce
recommendations that will actually make their way into legislation. Instead, the
commissions are largely symbolic, tangible manifestations that the government
truly does care about the problem in question.
In at least some instances, commissions hold the promise of something
more. They can provide a meaningful, impartial, and nonpartisan analysis of an
issue. The commission's function in these situations is analogous to the coroner
performing an autopsy to determine the cause of death or the National
Transportation Safety Board pinpointing the causes of an airplane crash. In
contexts where causes can be identified with some degree of scientific precision,
this model can work reasonably well. The Rogers Commission, which
determined that the Challengerspace shuttle disaster was caused by the effects of

Remarks of Brooksley Born at the Public Meeting of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,
http://fcicavailable
at
2009),
3-4,
(Sep.
17,
D.C.
Washington
static.law.stanford.edulcdn-media/fcic-testimony/2009-0917-CommissionerStatements.pdf
[hereinafter FCIC First Public Meeting]. Pecora's own report was written in June 1933, a year after
the first federal securities laws were passed and days after Congress passed the legislation that
created the SEC. The report was not what guided Congress, but the ongoing investigation. Senator
Dodd seemed to contemplate a similar relationship between Congress and the FCIC. He suggested
that the FCIC could report back to the appropriate congressional committees "as they uncover
155 CONG. REC. S4548
evidence or [come up with] ideas that would help us fill in these gaps ....
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009). While such an iterative process would have replicated the Pecora
investigation and might have been useful, there is no evidence that it actually occurred. FERA
simply required a report at the completion of the investigation. Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (May 20, 2009).
7 FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at 9-10.
72

74 See Ernest R. May, When Government Writes History, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 23, 2005, at 30.
7 See FLITNER, supra note 56, 29-40.
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cold temperatures on the rubber o-rings used in the booster rockets, provides an
example of this kind of successful investigation.
Two major problems affected the FCIC's ability to perform a similar
kind of analysis. The first was that re-constructing the root causes of a financial
crisis is a very different exercise than pinpointing design flaws in the space
shuttle. Answers are far less certain and far more contestable. Economists, for
example, continue to debate the cause of the Great Depression and are likely to
debate the causes of the financial crisis well into the future. The causes of a
financial crisis, moreover, implicate highly charged political issues in a manner
that dissecting a shuttle explosion simply does not. Grappling with those kinds
of issues makes it much more difficult for a commission to operate in a truly
impartial and nonpartisan manner.
The other major problem for the FCIC was uncertainty over precisely
what its mission was. The enabling legislation directed the FCIC to identify the
causes of the financial crisis. This seemed to be a classic crisis-oriented
commission. The constant comparisons to the Pecora investigation, however,
suggested that the FCIC was supposed to be building the public case for reform.
Much of the analysis and commentary before the hearings began concerned
whether the FCIC would be able to hold bankers accountable for wrecking havoc
on the economy. As noted previously, other commentators said that the FCIC's
job was to provide Congress with the information it needed to structure financial
reform, even though legislative efforts were already well under way at that point.
Which of these tasks was the FCIC supposed to be doing?
Apparently, even the commissioners were unsure. Different
commissioners seemed to have different views of the FCIC's mission. A few
seemed to be espousing multiple goals simultaneously. At the FCIC's initial
public meeting, Angelides said that he wanted the commission to conduct a
rigorous investigation that would provide the definitive account of the causes of
the financial crisis.77 "It's important that we deliver new information," he told
reporters on another occasion. "We can't just rehash what we've known to
date."7 To satisfy their statutory mission, the FCIC's hearings had to "shed light
not heat."79 Those statements were consistent with a dispassionate dissection of
the crisis. But at other times, Angelides struck an entirely different tone. The
chairman said that he wanted to examine the "greed, stupidity, hubris and
outright corruption" in the financial industry.
The first public hearing in
January 2010 seemed to be an attempt to recreate the power and atmosphere of

' REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT (June

6, 1986), availableat http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/genindex.htm.
7 See Opening Remarks of Chairman Phil Angelides, FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at
1-3 ("We have been called upon to conduct a full and fair investigation in the best interests of the
nation-pursuing the truth, uncovering the facts, and providing an unbiased, historical accounting
of what brought our financial system and our economy to its knees.").
7 Frank Rich, The OtherPlot to Wreck America, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2010, at WK10.
7 FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at 2.
80 Rich, supra note 78, at WK10.
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the Pecora investigation, without its depth of research. Angelides and other
commissioners asked the CEOs of Goldman Sachs, J. P. Morgan Chase, Bank of
America, and Morgan Stanley tough sounding questions about their role in the
crisis. It was "[p]olitical theater and public scolding," the New York Times wrote,
but with little substance and no progress toward a deeper understanding of the
forces that sparked the crisis.
Other commissioners complained about the tone of the hearings and
Angelides's role in setting the schedule and subject matter of the hearings. It was
really a complaint about using the hearings to fuel anger at the financial industry
in order to build public support for reform legislation. Republican commissioner
Its goal, he
thought "the first hearing was a fiasco."
Peter Wallison
this
hearing, the
for
any
preparation
"Without
complained, was pure publicity.
Commission summoned the CEOs of four of the largest U.S. financial
institutions, seemingly just so they could be photographed being sworn in." 83
The bigger problem from Wallison's perspective was that Angelides dictated the
schedule and subject matter of the hearings without any apparent consideration of
the results of the staffs investigatory efforts. For Wallison, it was putting the
cart before the horse. "The hearings should have been shaped by what was
turned up in the investigation, not function as drivers of what the Commission
would study," he subsequently wrote. Members of the staff, he charged, took the
same position. "There was a pervasive sense that a serious investigation was
being sacrificed to the publicity that could be wrung from public hearings." 84
Although hearings are typically viewed as the sine qua non of
independent commissions, the staff of the 9/11 Commission did not view them as
crucial; they saw hearings as a secondary task that would soak up precious time
Such
and resources that might otherwise be devoted to the investigation.8
concerns are legitimate, as were Wallison's complaints about having hearings
that were more show than substance. During the Pecora investigation there were
senators who tried to embarrass or ridicule witnesses with little preparation. As
often as not, those efforts backfired. 86 Pecora always built his hearings on a solid
foundation of investigation and research. Still, the purpose underlying most
crisis-oriented commissions is to show governmental concern over a problem. It
is virtually inconceivable, therefore, that there will be no public hearings. The
real question is not whether there will be hearings, but when those hearings will
be held, how many there should be, and how they will be conducted. Contrary to

81Editorial, The Show Must Not Go On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at WK7.
82 Wallison wrote a sole dissent from the FCIC report and, as described below, seemed to have his
own agenda during the investigation. Peter J. Wallison, Statement Submitted to the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in Connection with a Hearing on the Financial
Crisis Inquiry (May 10, 2011) at 3, available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/05/13/Senatetestimony-on-FCIC-dissent.pdf [hereinafter Wallison Testimony].
83 Wallison Testimony, supra note 82, at 4.
8 Id. at 3.
85 KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 58, at 126-27.
8 PERINO, supra note 5, at 124-25, 152-53.
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what Wallison's statement implied, Pecora showed that it was possible to have
both substance and show.
Wallison also expressed definite views on the relationship between the
FCIC inquiry and the financial reform effort, views that were strictly at odds with
the views of Born and Graham discussed earlier. For Wallison, it was critical
that any reform efforts cease until the FCIC had completed its work. "Congress,
the president, and the American people," he announced at the FCIC's initial
public meeting, "should want to know the central causes of the crisis before our
Congress adopts legislation that is supposed to prevent a recurrence." 8 7 If the
FCIC's mission was to provide Congress with data it could use to structure
reform, this view would obviously be correct. But, as is discussed in more detail
in Section III, it is not hard to imagine that partisan political considerations
played an important role in shaping Wallison's opinion. Under his plan,
congressional action would not occur until after the 2010 mid-term elections and
after anger at the financial community may have cooled, decreasing the
likelihood of comprehensive financial reform.
With these clashing views and agendas, the FCIC was unable to achieve
any of these varied goals. Unlike the Pecora investigation in which powerful
hearings drove public opinion, the FCIC's hearings were dull and largely tepid
affairs. Most hearings opened with commissioners and witnesses reading their
bland opening statements. Each commissioner then took his or her turn to
question each witness, using their allotted time to ask often long-winded and
compound questions or to make what were little more than self-serving speeches.
There was frequently no attempt to pin down witnesses who gave evasive or
incomplete answers and no attempt to develop a coherent narrative. Indeed, the
panel seemed to explicitly eschew any effort to develop a storyline listeners
could follow. Rather than follow up on what one commissioner would ask, the
next commissioner in the queue would often jump to a completely different line
of inquiry.
The byproduct of this presentation style was to turn the hearings
into what even Thomas admitted was little more than a "Whitman's Sampler" of
the topics likely to be covered in the FCIC's final report. 89
The FCIC also obviously failed to produce the official history of the
financial crisis. Members of Congress chided the commissioners for acting in
such an overtly partisan way on such an important assignment.90 That outcome,
8 FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at 16.
88This type of hearing is common for Congress and for independent commissions as well. Famed
physicist Richard Feynman was a member of the Rogers Commission, which studied the
Challenger shuttle disaster, and complained about this kind of desultory hearing. "[Miost of the
time," he wrote, "other people are asking questions you already know the answer to-or are not
interested in-and you get so fogged out that you're hardly listening when important points are
being passed over." FEYNMAN, supra note 58, at 128.
8 Sewell Chan & Eric Dash, FinancialCrisis Inquiry Wrestles with Setbacks, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5,
2010, at B4.
90 See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 25, at 28 (Statement of Representative Hensarling, "I think
it is sad that such an important work is hard to take seriously when it was conducted on such a
partisan basis.").
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however, involved more than just uncertainty over what the Commission was
supposed to accomplish. And it was Congress, as well as the commissioners,
who bore the blame for the FCIC's failure to achieve consensus. As discussed
below, the way Congress designed the FCIC and the political context in which it
operated made it highly unlikely that the Commission could conduct an effective
investigation and achieve a meaningful consensus.

III. THE DESIGN AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF INDEPENDENT
COMMISSIONS
The FCIC was a commission that, like the 9/11 Commission before it,
seemed destined to founder. Six separate bills were introduced in the 11Ith
Congress to create some form of independent commission to investigate the
A careful analysis of the choices Congress made in
financial crisis.91
establishing and structuring the Commission shows that Congress hamstrung the
FCIC from the start, making it difficult for the panel to conduct a meaningful
investigation of the causes of the financial crisis or to write a unanimous report.
This section focuses on three areas: (1) the structure and methods used for
selecting the commissioners; (2) the FCIC's mandate and resources as well as the
timetable for the investigation; and (3) the restrictions placed on the FCIC's
investigatory powers. The section also briefly discusses some obvious ways that
politicians tried to influence the FCIC's operations.

A. Structure and Commissioner Selection Methods
Congressional investigations are viewed as, and often are, highly charged
political affairs. Particularly where Congress is purporting to perform its
traditional function of checking executive abuse or rooting out executive
corruption, investigations seem either to proliferate or grow more contentious in
instances of divided government.92 All too often, congressional investigations

The six proposals were:
Senate amendment 995 to S. 386, Cong. Rec. S4588 (April 22, 2009). The amendment was
sponsored by Republican Senator Johnny Isakson and co-sponsored by Democratic Senators Kent
Conrad, Christopher Dodd, and Sheldon Whitehouse and Republican Senators Olympia Snow and
Saxby Chambliss.
S. 195, 111th Cong. (2009), at § 5 (the "Taxpayer Protection Act," sponsored by Democratic
Senator Dorgan);
S. 298, 111th Cong. (2009) (the "Financial Markets Commission Act of 2009," sponsored by
Senator Isakson);
H.R. 74, 111th Cong. (2009) (the "Financial Oversight Commission Act of 2009," sponsored by
Republican Representative Issa);
H.R. 768, 111th Cong. (2009) (the "Commission on Financial Crisis Accountability Act of 2009,"
sponsored by Democratic Representative Larson); and
H.R. 2111, 111th Cong. (2009) (the "Congressional Commission on Financial Accountability and
Preparedness Act of 2009," sponsored by Republican Representative Burgess).
92 Kriner & Schlicker, supra note 38, at 15.
9'
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have been subject to significant abuse. There are myriad examples of legislators
using investigations for self-aggrandizement or simply to score political points.
In the public mind, however, commissions seem different. They are
stocked with accomplished, well-known individuals, frequently with expertise in
the subject matter under consideration. 93 Their stature is intended to enhance the
credibility of the investigation. Commissioners are supposed to be free of
partisan influence and willing to engage in a thorough and unbiased inquiry of
the matter under consideration because they have established national reputations
that they wish to preserve. 94 Indeed, these requirements were written into the
FCIC's enabling legislation.9 5
There is also a strong unanimity norm that is typically at work in
independent commissions9 6 that can help to smooth over differences of opinion, a
norm that might be thought to be at its strongest when commissions tackle
important national issues. Indeed, clashes during the deliberative process are
seen as a benefit of commissions if the resulting report "represents an honest
synthesis of varying opinions."97 The unanimity norm is, however, a two-edged
sword. In some cases, it might cause commissioners with disparate viewpoints to
reach a meaningful consensus. In others, the only way to achieve consensus may
be to write a report that is so watered down that it fails to tackle the tough issues
that it was meant to address.
For a commission's recommendations to be taken seriously, however, the
clashes among commissioners cannot be seen as base partisan politics. For
example, during the first meeting of the 9/11 Commission chairman Thomas
Kean warned his fellow commissioners that politics could destroy the
commission's work. "If we become like everybody else in Washington," he
lectured, "if the Republicans on the commission start fighting Democrats, then
we'll destroy our credibility."9 8 Kean and the 9/11 Commission's vice-chairman,
Lee Hamilton, constantly emphasized the need for bipartisan cooperation and

9 See FLITNER, supra note 56, at 47.
94
ALAN BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION 211-15 (1955).

9 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617, § 5(b)(2)
(May 20, 2009) ("It is the sense of the Congress that individuals appointed to the Commission
should be prominent United States citizens with national recognition and significant depth of
experience in such fields as banking, regulation of markets, taxation, finance, economics, consumer
protection, and housing.").
6
See FLITNER, supra note 56, at 88 ("Conflict on commissions may be restrained by a desire for
unanimity growing out of the belief that a united front conveys more legitimacy than does a
fragmented one."). As Slade Gorton, a member of 9/11 Commission put it, if the commission
could not issue a unanimous report, "we were wasting our time and the government's money. So
KIRSTEN LUNDBERG, PILOTING A
there was that frame of reference from the beginning."
BIPARTISAN SHIP: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS OF THE 9/11 CoMMissioN 11 (2005) (Kennedy School

of Government Case Program, C15-05-1813.0).
9 FRANK POPPER, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSIONs 16 (1970).
98SHENON, supra note 60, at 70-71
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unanimity. 99 Another 9/11 commissioner, Richard Ben-Veniste, made a similar
point about the dangers of partisanship:
Unless we could somehow get beyond the kind of Washington partisan
ambiance that had for so long characterized public discourse in this
town, the commission would in the end be doomed to failure. Unless
we could put aside our individual partisan feelings and views, the
ultimate impact of what we had to say would be greatly diminished. 0
In its first public meeting, several FCIC commissioners stressed the need for a
unanimous report if the American people were going to take the work of the
Commission seriously.10 '
The problem of overt political partisanship was particularly acute for the
9/11 Commission. The terrorist attacks were a profound national tragedy that,
however briefly, united an increasingly disputatious populace. Emotions were
still raw when the 9/11 Commission was created just over a year later. In that
kind of climate, public perceptions that commissioners were politicizing the
investigation risked enormous backlash that could scuttle the entire effort and
damage the offending political party.102 This is not to say that party politics were
Democratic commissioners on the 9/11
absent from the investigation.
Commission, for example, were convinced that their fellow Republican
commissioner, Fred Fielding, was constantly relaying information concerning
confidential internal communications to the White House.103 White House staff
members, hoping to destroy the credibility of Richard Clarke, a witness hostile to
the administration, helped to prepare questions for Republican commissioners. 104
There were numerous other examples as well. However, the political costs of
appearing to take partisan positions were so high that at least some of the normal
gamesmanship that might be expected to occur did not.
If one examines the congressional debate over the creation of the FCIC,
it is easy to find similar expressions of the value of nonpartisan, independent
commissions. Although Senators Byron Dorgan and John McCain wanted to

supra note 96, at 11-15.
' Id. at 18.
101Statement of Bob Graham, FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at 10 ("We must strive to
be apartisan in the manner in which we proceed towards the goal of a unanimous report which will
command the attention of the American people and the Congress."); Statement of Bill Thomas,
FCIC First Public Meeting, supra note 72, at 17 ("I fervently hope that we'll be unanimous . .
102 KEAN AND HAMILTON, WITHOUT PRECEDENT, supra note 58, at 6.
103 See SHENON, supra note 60, at 27. Professor William K. Black, who served as Deputy Staff
Director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
("NCFIRRE"), relates a similar incident. As Black recalled, "One of the Commissioners, a
Republican, good-naturedly announced that he was appointed to serve as the Bush administration
'spy."' William K. Black, Flaws Inherent in the Current Commission, and How to Minimize Them,
NEW DEAL 2.0, (Jul. 14, 2009, 10:00 AM) http://www.newdeal20.org/2009/07/14/flaws-inherentin-the-current-commission-and-how-to-minimize-them-3147/.
9 See LUNDBERG,
00

104 See SHENON, supra note 60, at 280.
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create a Senate select committee to study the crisis, os such a committee was not
included in the final bill, ostensibly because such a select committee would not
be viewed as nonpartisan and objective. "We are part of what needs to be
scrutinized," argued Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson. "If we left this just strictly
to a select committee, it would be like appointing the board of directors to AIG to
tell us what went wrong with AIG. It wouldn't be a good autopsy. It wouldn't
be objective.,,1o6
Other senators and representatives expressed similar sentiments in favor
of a "nonpartisan commission." Representative Darryl Issa (later a fierce critic
of the FCIC) argued:
I view the effort to create this commission as a vehicle for this
Congress to demonstrate a willingness to set aside partisanship and put
the interests of our country first. As with the 9/11 Commission, the
Financial Markets Commission report should be free of accusations of
political showmanship and a partisan slant that have tainted current
investigations. This Commission is not the place for partisanship [or]
Congressional meddling. It is a place for the American people to get
answers. 107
The FCIC was, according to these sentiments, supposed to be able to perform the
same dispassionate analysis of the financial crisis that the Rogers Commission
performed on the Challenger space shuttle disaster.
The FCIC, of course, proved that it was incapable of such an analysis.
Given how it was structured and the political environment in which it operated, it
had little hope of doing so right from the start. When it comes to crisis-oriented
commissions operating in charged political environments, the 9/11 Commission
was the rare example of an independent panel that actually could at least partially
divorce itself from immediate political considerations and operate independently.
It was a tribute, in no small measure, to its chairman, who constantly sought to
steer a course between the partisan views that were sometimes expressed by its
members, although he was aided by the risks associated with politicizing the
September 1 1" attacks. 0 8
Rather than being nonpartisan undertakings intended to provide
independent advice to Congress, crisis-oriented commissions frequently operate
as partisan affairs, designed to advocate each party's existing positions.
Angelides and Thomas apparently did not possess Kean's and Hamilton's
instincts and skills for bipartisanship. Republican commissioners complained
that Angelides was "inflexible and a micromanager." When Thomas was in the
House, he reportedly "had sometimes volatile relations with leaders of both

'os 155 CONG REC. S4552 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009).
'0 155 CONG. REc. S4550-51 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009).
107155 CONG. REc. H5269 (daily ed. May 6, 2009); see also 155 CONG REc. S4545 (daily ed.
May
6, 2009) (comments of Senator Leahy).
'os See generally LUNDBERG, supra note 96; see FLITNER, supra note 56, 51-53 (noting the

importance of chairman's role in maintaining a nonpartisan atmosphere).
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lawmakers in
parties"10 9 and was ranked among "the 'hottest-tempered'
0
staffers.""
Congressional
of
polls
magazine
Washingtonian
Of course, it is entirely possible that neither Angelides nor Thomas were
selected for their skills at building bipartisan consensus. In fact, given the
divisive political atmosphere in Washington, the selection method used to pick
the FCIC commissioners seemed unlikely to generate a truly independent and
unbiased investiation free of preconceived notions about the causes of the
FERA required Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and
financial crisis. I
Senate majority leader Harry Reid to select three members each and the minority
leaders of the House and Senate (John Boehner and Mitch McConnell) to select
the remaining four. To further solidify the bipartisan makeup of the panel, the
statute mandated that the chair and vice-chair could not be from the same
political party, although given the appointment structure such an outcome would
seem to be highly unlikely. 1 12 In effect, it looked very much like AIG board
investigating itself; the only difference was that the board, rather than conducting
the investigation, would pick the investigators.
The political leaders in Congress were, and remain, engaged in highly
charged, partisan political battles, including over which party bore the bulk of the
blame for the financial crisis and ensuing recession. With such a significant
political question at stake, it might be difficult for a bipartisan commission to
reach a consensus. Indeed, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report
warned specifically about this danger when it provided advice about the structure
of any commission created to investigate the financial crisis. On April 29, 2009,
just weeks before the FCIC was created, it acknowledged that bipartisan
commissions can be useful because the joint recommendations that do emerge
immediately gain greater credibility. At the same time, the CRS warned, the
prospects of reaching a consensus on recommendations may be substantially
dimmed when the subject under review is a political football. "In situations
where a commission is tasked with studying inherently partisan issues," the
report noted, "the appointment of an equal number of majority and minority
commissioners may serve to promote partisanship within the commission rather
than suppress it."
The FCIC that emerged a few weeks later had six Democratic
commissioners and four Republican ones, but that slight change seems to have
done little to relieve the partisan bickering. In fact, vice chairman Thomas later

'" John D. McKinnon, PartisanRancor Undercuts Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2011, at A4.
110Ben Pershing, The Republican led House that Bill Thomas built, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2011, at

A19.
"' Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617, § 5(b)(1)
(May 20, 2009).
112 Id. at § 5(b)(3)(B).
" MATTHEw ERIC GLASSMAN & JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R40553, PROPOSALS
FOR A CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 5 (2009),
availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40553.pdf.
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complained that the presence of this Democratic majority made matters worse,
reducing further the chances that the factions would try to achieve consensus.
From the beginning, I thought that the Commission was created for
political purposes with a partisan structure and a partisan agenda. It
called for six of us to be appointed by Democrats and four by
Republicans. And any six votes were all that was needed to transmit the
report to the President and Congress. The math is simple.114
Thomas was right, but only superficially. The atmospherics would have
been much better if there were an even five-five split and perhaps it might have
been easier to foster bipartisan cooperation. To have its report taken seriously,
however, the FCIC needed to reach a consensus, giving the majority less
practical ability to simply ram through its preferences for conducting the
investigation and reporting its results. Even with a six-four split, both sides
should have had an incentive to bridge the gaps that divided them, unless of
course bridging those gaps was less important than satisfying the needs and
desires of their own political constituencies.
Even the 9/11 Commission, which is generally considered to be an
exemplar of non-partisan independent commissions, did not operate free from
political influence or considerations. Its best-selling report, for example, has
been criticized for its unwillingness to place blame on specific individuals,
particularly Presidents Clinton and Bush. It was a conscious choice by the chair
and vice-chair to achieve the unanimity they so desperately desired. "The
instructions that we gave [to the staff]," vice chair Hamilton recalled, were to tell
the story of the 9/11 attacks "as non-judgmentally as possible, stripping out
conclusions and making it very factual." 11 5 Still the actual drafting of politically
sensitive portions of the final report was grueling, according to Hamilton,
because "the underlying tension here was partisan; it was between the Democrats
who wanted to protect Clinton, and the Republicans who wanted to protect
Bush."' 16

1 14

House Hearing, supranote 25, at 12. Thomas added:
When inordinate hours of staff time are being used to find 'gotcha' documents
to support provocative headlines rather than to produce material relevant to
Commissioner deliberations; when the proceedings of private Commission
meetings are inaccurately leaked again and again in an attempt to embarrass the
minority and create artificial hype for a commercial book; when the minority is
forced to vote on potentially illegal motions presented to them just one day
prior; when the final findings and conclusions of the majority are first presented
to the minority four days before the final vote; and when minority views are
then excluded by a 6-4 vote from the report and suppressed in the commercial
book, in the event presenting the report, and on the Commission's website, it
becomes abundantly clear that consensus is not a primary goal.

Id. at 78-79.
." LUNDBERG,
16
at

Id.

57.

supra note 96, at 14.
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Consensus, therefore, came at a cost. In order to "achieve unanimity,"
one author noted, "there was little accountability."" 7 The report maintained an
almost maniacal balance-whenever a person or institution was criticized in one
sentence, it was lauded in another, even in situations where it seemed clear that
It refused to make judgments about
such balance was not warranted.
contradictory assertions, although its staff was probably in the best position to
determine which was more credible.119 Such an "imprecise, anodyne and
impersonal assignment of responsibility for the U.S. government's failure to
prevent the 9/11 attacks," one critic wrote, was "exactly the wrong message to
send to future government officials and the people who train them."12 0 Given the
political limits of bipartisan commissions, however, it was the only message that
was feasible to send.121
Indeed, the CRS analysis regarding the potential for partisanship on an
independent committee echoes the observations 9/11 Commission chairman
Thomas Kean had made several years earlier about his own difficulties operating
in this kind of political undertaking. "If you want something to fail, you take a
controversial topic and appoint five people from each party. You make sure they
are appointed by the most partisan people from each party-the leaders of the
party. And, just to be sure, let's ask the commission to finish the report during
the most partisan period of time-the presidential election season."l22 The FCIC

117SHENON, supra note 60, at 387.
118May, supranote 74, at 33-34.

"1 Id. at 34.
120 Ernest R. May, Phillip D. Zelikow, Richard A. Falkenrath, Sins of Commission? Falkenrathand
His Critics, 29 INT'L SEC. 208, 210-11 (2005). While it may have been the wrong message, it was
hardly an unsurprising one. Independent commission reports frequently sacrifice specificity to
obtain unity. FLITNER, supranote 56, at 92.
121Professor Black's experience with the NCFIRRE, which studied the causes of the savings and
loan crisis, was similar:
The Commission members that actively participated generally found that they
could work together constructively by muting their disagreements and
compromising. In particular, some of the Commissioners were adamant that
"control fraud" (fraud led by the CEOs of seemingly legitimate businesses) had
to be trivial. Other Commissioners believed that the factual investigations and
data we had assembled demonstrated that control frauds were a major
contributor to the crisis. The result was a compromise in which a number was
made up-the NCFIRRE report states that fraud could not have caused more
than 10-15 percent of all S&L losses. The report, however, presented analyses
explaining why fraud caused far larger losses. It was all very polite, sometimes
internally inconsistent, and contrary to everything that made Pecora's
investigation successful. The NCFIRRE report, at the Commissioners'
direction, does not hold any individual accountable.
Black, supranote 103.
122 May, supra note 74, at 30. To be sure, the 9/11 Commission did manage to produce not only a
consensus report, but a best-seller to boot. The credit for that result, however, would seem to
belong to the 9/11 commissioners and not to Congress and the Bush administration, which
appeared to take substantial steps to hamstring the investigation. See generally SHENON, supra note
60. The 9/11 Commission report, moreover, was not the first to achieve best-seller status. The
reports of the Warren Commission, the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders, the
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was, of course, originally scheduled to release its report on December 15, 2010,
just weeks after the 2010 mid-term elections.123
Indeed, several Republican representatives made precisely this point in
the floor debate on FERA, although their primary purpose in doing so seemed to
be to accuse Democratic leaders of being primarily responsible for the financial
crisis. Texas Representative Michael Burgess, for example, warned that
commissioners selected by the political leaders in Congress were unlikely to
assign blame to those same political leaders.124 Despite these warnings, when
Congress created the FCIC it used almost precisely the same selection methods
as used in the 9/11 Commission and ensured that the report would be in the last
drafting stages during what was sure to be a highly charged political
environment.
The problem with this appointment method is not just that
commissioners are unlikely to blame their political patrons. If the partisan
political environment is strongly divisive, as is currently the case and as was the
case in 2009, members of Congress are unlikely to appoint commission members
who could be expected to work hard to find areas of agreement. Instead, the
most likely appointees would be individuals with strong political ties125 or those
who could reasonably be expected to tote the party line,126 swamping the
National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence, and the President's Commission
on Campus Unrest were published in paperback editions by private publishers and sold millions of
copies. See FLITNER, supranote 56, at 10 1-02.
123 Pub. L. No. 111-21, §5(h)(1), 123 Stat. 1630 (2009).
124155 CONG. REc. H5687 (May 6, 2009) ("Senate 386 allows the chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee to select a commissioner. The chairman of the Senate Banking Committee may have
been part of the problem. This bill allows the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee
to appoint a representative to the commission. Mr. Speaker, the chairman of the House Financial
Services Committee may have been part of the problem. Senate 386 creates an accountability
commission focused on protecting the government.").
125Angelides has been described as a "crony of Nancy Pelosi." Hirsh, supra note 14. Vice
chairman Bill Thomas served fourteen terms in the House of Representatives, was a former chair of
the House Ways and Means Committee, and, according to one account, "played a key role in
helping members of the House GOP's current leadership team get where they are today." Pershing,
supra note 110, at A19. Other FCIC members were substantial campaign contributors to the
politicians who named them. Aaron Kiersh, Newly Appointed Wall Street Investigators are Big
Campaign Contributors, OPEN
SECRETS
BLOG
(July
17,
2009
5:47
PM)
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/07/newly-appointed-wall-street-in.html. One assessment of
the FCIC as a whole was that "despite the presence of a few standouts like Brooksley Born, the
derivatives whistle-blower from the '90s, the commission is manned with partisans of the left and
the right who could easily tie themselves-and the investigation-up in ideological knots." Hirsh,
14.
126 ra note
su
The selection of members for the 9/11 Commission followed a similar pattern, with one key
difference. The enabling legislation for the 9/11 Commission required President George W. Bush
to select the committee's chairman. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2408, § 603(a)(1) (2002). This feature made the political motivations that
lay behind the choice of committee members even more overt. After Henry Kissinger abruptly
resigned rather than disclose the clients of his consulting firm, President Bush, with consultation of
his key political adviser, Karl Rove, looked for a new chairman who they thought was unlikely to
embarrass the administration and threaten President Bush's chances for re-election. Their choice,
Thomas Kean, the former governor of New Jersey, was not as compliant as Rove had originally
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unanimity norm that would normally apply to commissions. Any attempt to
build consensus among these disparate commissioners was probably doomed
from the start. More troubling, such commissioners have the ability undermine
the commission by leaking information to the press or by disrupting substantially
staff operations.
Available public evidence suggests that Peter J. Wallison, a fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a former General Counsel of the
Treasury Department in the Reagan administration, played this kind of role on
the FCIC. Wallison's AEI biography notes that "he had a significant role in the
development of the Reagan administration's proposals for the deregulation of the
financial services industry."1 27 Wallison was also a long-time critic of federal
housing policy, arguing as far back as 2003 that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
should be privatized. 12 In the midst of the financial crisis, Wallison was quick
to identify federal housing policy as the culprit.129 It was a claim he repeatedly
made in the ensuing years, including in November 2009, after he was already a
member of the FCIC. In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, he chided "the left" for
blaming the crisis on "deregulation of the financial system." 30 Government's
misguided interference with the housing market was the true source. "If the
lending,"
financial crisis was caused by subprime mortgages and predatory
31
happen."'1
it
made
policies
own
Wallison wrote, "the government's
To say that Wallison had well-established views on financial
deregulation and housing policy is an understatement. Indeed, at the FCIC's first
public meeting, Wallison's opening statement focused almost exclusively on
subprime mortgages and he asked whether "government policy" played a role.132
It was thus hardly a surprise when Wallison contributed a solo dissent to the

hoped, but that outcome did not alter the political calculus behind his selection. See SHENON, supra
note 60, at 15-19,25-26, 35-39.
127 Peter J Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in FinancialPolicy Studies, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, http://www.aei.org/scholar/58 (last visited Apr. 7, 2012); see also Robert M. Garsson,
Banking Lawyer Recalls His Term as PresidentReagan's Counsel, AMER. BANKER, Mar. 25, 1987,
at 12 (noting that "as general counsel for the Department of Treasury under Donald T. Regan,
[Wallison] carried the administration's ball on financial deregulation, arguing for a marketplace in
which banks, securities firms, and others could be able to compete head on."); Wallison Leaving?,
AMER. BANKER, Oct. 22, 1984, at 2 (noting that "Wallison is known as one of the chief architects
and lobbyists for the Treasury Department's proposals to Congress that would deregulate the
banking industry.").
128 See PETER J. WALLISON ET AL., PRIVATIZING FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL

HOME LOAN BANKS (2004); Peter J. Wallison, Privatize Mortgage Market to Minimize Economic
Risk, 168 AM. BANKER, 7 (Mar. 2003).
129 See Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit
Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, at A29.
130 Peter J. Wallison, Op-Ed, Barney Frank,PredatoryLender, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2009, at Al 9.
131

id.
132 Commissioner Statements, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N 16 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at

http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedialfcic-testimony/2009-09 17CommissionerStatements.pdf.
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FCIC report that blamed the financial crisis exclusively on federal housing
policy.133

A July 2011 report by the Democratic staff of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform ("Oversight Report") casts some light on
Wallison's participation in the work of the Commission.134 Authors of the
Oversight Report asserted that they reviewed more than 400,000 internal FCIC
emails and other documents.'3 5 The material had been produced in an
investigation launched by Republican Representative Darrell Issa of potential
Democratic mismanagement and partisanship on the FCIC.136 To be sure, the
Oversight Report is itself a partisan political document-it sought to undercut
Issa's charges by showing equally partisan behavior among Republicans on the
FCIC. Still, the Oversight Report finds that the documents the staff reviewed
"raise significant new questions about whether Republican Commissioners
geared their efforts on the Commission toward helping House Republicans in
their campaign to repeal the Dodd-Frank Act, rather than determining the facts
that led to the economic crisis." 137
Without full disclosure and release of the underlying documents, it is
important not to accept that conclusion uncritically. Nonetheless, the material
quoted in the report does suggest that throughout the investigation Wallison was
unwilling to re-visit his pre-existing positions, virtually assuring that the FCIC
would be unable to release a consensus report. One Republican staff member
called Wallison "intractable."13 8 "Everyone agrees," the same staffer added,
"that there is simply no way to make Peter happy."1 39 The Oversight Report also
charges that Wallison improperly leaked confidential Commission documents
and that he encouraged Republican members of the FCIC to structure their
dissents to support attempts to repeal Dodd-Frank.140 "It's very important,"
Wallison wrote to the other Republican commissioners, "that what we say in our
separate statements not undermine the ability of the new House GOP to modify
or repeal Dodd-Frank."l41
Similarly partisan behavior has been attributed to the Democratic
In January 2010 two FCIC staff
commissioners, particularly Angelides.
members named Countrywide Financial and its chief executive Angelo Mozilo as
targets for potential investigations and hearings, Angelides reportedly vetoed that
plan, telling the staffers that Mozilo was off limits for the FCIC's public

133 Peter J. Wallison, DissentingStatement, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N 443 (Jan. 2011),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-reports/fcic-finalreport full.pdf.
134See Democratic Staff, An Examination of Attacks against the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov'T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REP. (July 13, 2011)
[hereinafter OversightReport].

13s Id.

I36
id.

at 3.

' Id. at 5.
0

14

Id. at 12-14.

141Id. at 9.
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hearings.142 Both staffers, Martin T. Biegelman and Bradley Bondi, eventually

.
resigned. 143
Republican commissioners voiced similar complaints about partisanship
on the committee. In testimony to Congress, Thomas complained about the "topdown structure from day one."'" There was little attempt to achieve consensus,
Thomas asserted, because the Democratic majority on the Commission was not
required to in order to move forward. "[W]hen it came down to the crunch," he
testified, "all the votes were 6-4." 145 Wallison complained that he had "never
seen a Commission as badly organized and run as this one."'4 Commissioners,
he asserted, were given little opportunity to hash out their competing views about
the causes of the crisis. Wallison placed the Commission's failures squarely on
Angelides. "Throughout its 18 month life," Wallison charged, "the Commission
focused only on issues that the chairman wanted to cover, was more interested in
publicity than in a thorough investigation, and never paid serious attention to
other views."1 4 7
The truth of these competing allegations is difficult to assess without a
deeper analysis of the internal operations of the FCIC.148 What is clear is that
Angelides, unlike Kean, was unable to bridge the partisan differences on the
Commission. In the spring of 2010, Angelides sought to close off further
discussion and analysis of Wallison's theory that government housing policy was
solely to blame for the financial crisis. "For what I have seen," Angelides wrote,
"the staff has spent more time responding to your questions and requests for

142 Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A FinancialCrisis with Little Guilt,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2011, at Al.
143 Sewell Chan & Eric Dash, InternalDissent and Staff Losses May Hurt FinancialCrisis Panel,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at B 1; Sewell Chan & Eric Dash, FinancialCrisisInquiry Wrestles with

Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at B4.

'" FCIC Hearing, supra note 25, at 32.
145 Id. Another Republican Commissioner, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, disagreed. He thought that
partisanship of this kind did not become a problem until the Commission was completing its work.
Id. at 51 ("I am disturbed that late in the game, it appeared to become partisan in nature when, in
fact, what I saw during the vast majority of the Commissioners' deliberations were 10 individuals
with views that did not agree and a willingness to look at the data and try to work that out."). Id.
146
Peter J. Wallison, Statement Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs In Connection With A Hearing On the FinancialCrisis Inquiry Commission, AM.
ENTER. INST. 2 (May 10, 2011), http://www.aei.org/files/2011/05/13/Senate-testimony-on-FCICdissent.pdf.
147Id. at 5. A parapraxis in an Angelides radio interview from November 2011 suggested there was
at least a germ of truth to Wallison's assertion. After claiming that New York mayor Michael
Bloomberg did not understand the true causes of the financial crisis, Angelides volunteered that he
would send Bloomberg "a copy of my book." After a long pause he corrected himself; he would
send Bloomberg a copy of "the Commission's report." The Brian Lehrer Show (WNYC radio
broadcast Nov. 2011).
148 For example, the last point Wallison makes seems to be a complaint that the staff did not take
his view of the causes of the financial crisis seriously enough. According to the Oversight Report,
however, the FCIC staff spent a great deal of time analyzing data that Wallison provided, but
ultimately concluded that Wallison's theory was flawed. Oversight Report, supra note 134, at 1621.
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information than any other Commissioner."1 49 That summer, Wallison wrote a
bitter reply, denouncing Angelides for ignoring his theories and demonstrating
once again his own intransigence and partisan approach to the inquiry. "I don't
like being told that I disagree with everything," Wallison complained.so
You should know that I have no compunction about filing a separate statement if
I am not persuaded by data, by facts that have been tested and are not subject to
dispute.

. .

. I hear that we should accept the point of view of 'experts' as

evidence, as in a trial. As we all should know, in a trial each side can select its
experts. All the experts I have ever suggested for the Commission's hearings
have been rejected or ignored. There is a price to pay for that.' 5'
B. Mandate and Resources
An obvious way to limit the potential effectiveness of an independent
commission is to give it an expansive mandate, few resources, and a short
timetable for completing its work. All three techniques were used in the creation
of the FCIC.
Congress instructed the FCIC to investigate twenty-two separate aspects
of the financial crisis' 52 as well as the causes of the collapse of each major

149 Id. at 20.

Id.
' Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
152 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, § 5(c). Congress required the FCIC "to examine
the causes of the current financial economic crisis in the United States, specifically the role of(A) fraud and abuse in the financial sector, including fraud and abuse toward consumers in the
mortgage sector;
(B) Federal and State financial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced or failed to
enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements;
(C) the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various
governments;
(D) monetary policy and the availability of terms of credit;
(E) accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of offbalance sheet vehicles;
(F) tax treatment of financial products and investments;
(G) capital requirements and regulations on leverage and liquidity, including the capital structures
of regulated and non-regulated financial entities;
(H) credit rating agencies in the financial system, including, reliance on credit ratings by financial
institutions and Federal financial regulators, the use of credit ratings in financial regulation, and the
use of credit ratings in the securitization markets;
(I) lending practices and securitization, including the originate-to-distribute model for extending
credit and transferring risk;
(J) affiliations between insured depository institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of
nonbanking companies;
(K) the concept that certain institutions are "too-big-to-fail" and its impact on market expectations;
(L) corporate governance, including the impact of company conversions from partnerships or
corporations;
(M) compensation structures;
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financial institution that failed during the 2008 financial crisis.' 5 3 Congress
recognized the enormity of this task; indeed, that is, as noted earlier, one reason
why it chose to form an independent commission rather than conducting the
inquiry through a select committee. 154 Nonetheless, it gave the Commission little
money to complete the job-just $8 million-underscoring again that the
investigation was more symbolic than real.' 5 Here too, the FCIC mirrored the
9/11 Commission, which was originally allotted just $3 million.1 56 To place
these dollar figures in context, consider that during roughly the same period
when Congress created the 9/11 Commission, it appropriated approximately $50
million to investigate the Columbia space shuttle disaster. 57 The independent
commission investigating the Challenger space shuttle accident spent $175
million (including $100 million searching for debris) in 1986 (approximately
$343 million in 2009 dollars). 5 8 To be sure, these comparisons are not entirely
apt-an accident investigation is far different than an analysis of the causes of a
terrorist attack or financial crisis. The Columbia investigation, for example,
involved an expensive effort to reconstruct the recovered remnants of the shuttle.
While explaining the financial crisis might be cheaper, there is a strong case to be
made that doing the job correctly required far more resources. After all, the
shuttle investigations were analyzing discrete events; the FCIC was trying to
untangle decades of private sector decisions and governmental policies.

(N) changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation
for others with similar skill sets in the labor market;
(0) the legal and regulatory structure of the United States housing market;
(P) derivatives and unregulated financial products and practices, including credit default swaps;
(Q) short-selling;
(R) financial institution reliance on numerical models, including risk models and credit ratings;
(S) the legal and regulatory structure governing financial institutions, including the extent to which
the structure creates the opportunity for financial institutions to engage in regulatory arbitrage;
(T) the legal and regulatory structure governing investor and mortgagor protection;
(U) financial institutions and government-sponsored enterprises; and
(V) the quality of due diligence undertaken by financial institutions.
Id.
"' See id. § 5(c)(2) (requiring the FCIC "to examine the causes of the collapse of each major
financial institution that failed (including institutions that were acquired to prevent their failure) or
was likely to have failed if not for the receipt of exceptional Government assistance from the
Secretary of the Treasury during the period beginning in August 2007 through April 2009. .
15 4 See supra notes 67 and 68 and accompanying text.
5s OversightReport, supra note 134, at 26.
156 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306,
116 Stat. 2383, 2413
§ 611(a) (Nov. 27, 2002).
157 Ralph Vartabedian & Peter Pae, Cost of Columbia Accident Inquiry
Is Soaring, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 2003, at 18. This figure does not include the money spent searching for debris, which has
been estimated at approximately $300 million. William Langewiesche, Columbia's Last Flight:
The Inside Story of the Investigation-And the CatastropheIt Laid Bare, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2003, at
73. New York Times columnist Frank Rich offered an even more colorful comparison. The FCIC
"had less than one-sixth the budget of the musical 'Spider-Man' to shed light on years of opaque
financial maneuvers by huge, lawyered-up institutions." Frank Rich, At Last, Bernie Madoff Gives
Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at 8.
1ss Vartabedian & Pae, supra note 157.
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Shortly after it began operations, the commissioners apparently reached a
consensus that they had insufficient funds to complete the investigation. At a
closed meeting on November 17, 2009, the consensus among the commissioners
was that vice chairman Thomas should "take the lead with Congress" to obtain
additional funding. 59 The original plan was to ask for an additional $3 million,
but that was later reduced to $2.66 million, and then again to $1.8 million, a 23
percent increase over its original $8 million budget. 60 That amount, the
commissioners complained, was probably far less than the firms questioned were
paying their lawyers and media advisors.' 6 '
In addition to paltry budgets, both the FCIC and the 9/11 Commission
were given tight deadlines for completing their respective investigations,
eighteen months for the 9/11 Commission and two years for the FCIC. These
deadlines were particularly problematic because so much of the beginning stages
of the inquiry would not involve any actual investigation but would be devoted to
setting up the commission and hiring the staff, an undertaking that has been
compared to setting up "a new government agency" in a period of weeks.162 Not
surprisingly, much of the first few months were taken up with these logistical
details, leaving even less time to conduct the actual investigation. For example,
the FCIC did not name 14 senior staff members until December 2009, seven
months after it was created and just one month before its first public hearings.
The FCIC's statutory authorization was not unusual-short deadlines are the
norm rather than the exception for independent commissions-but it created a
strong risk, particularly given the long list of matters that it was required to
analyze, that the investigation would necessarily be shallow, focusing on
compiling previously disclosed information and recounting existing themes and
explanations.' 64
These constraints created another difficulty as well. To save time and
money, FCIC staffers were often detailed from Treasury, the Federal Reserve,
and the SEC-the very governmental bodies they were asked to evaluate.
Wendy Edelberg, an economist on loan from the Federal Reserve, replaced J.
Thomas Greene, as the staff director. Bradley Bondi worked at the SEC. 6 1
There is no evidence to suggest that the efforts of these individuals were in any
way lacking and they presumably had the requisite expertise to undertake this

59 OversightReport, supra note 134, at 26-27.
60 id.
161 It

is worth noting, however, that few resources, in and of itself, does not doom an investigation
to failure. Pecora had an even more meager budget, just $180,000. Adjusting for inflation, Pecora
managed to scrape by with just 30 percent of the money the FCIC had and with an even smaller
staff. The explanation for the different outcomes is not just in the resources deployed, but in the
way these two investigations were organized and in how they used (or failed to use) their powers.
162 LUNDBERG, supra note 96, at 15; see FLITNER, supra note 56, at 59 (noting that lengthy start-up
times are common among commissions).
163 Chan & Dash, supra note 20, at B4. Similar delays plagued the 9/11 Commission as well.
SHENON, supra note 60, at 92.
' See FLITNER, supra note 56, at 61-64.
165 Chan & Dash, supra note 20, at B4.
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investigation, but relying on them raised significant potential questions about the
impartiality of the investigation. Outside observers might expect that these kinds
of staffer would bring their own loyalties, biases, and blind spots to the
investigation. Perhaps they would be willing to see their agencies in a better
light than they actually deserved. In some cases, FCIC staffers were slated to
return to those agencies, which could be expected to heighten these tendencies.
Here too, the FCIC closely resembled the 9/11 Commission. At the very least,
such relationships could reasonably be expected to create a perception of a
conflict of interest when it came to exploring the government's role in the

financial crisis.166
C. Restricting the Commission's Investigatory Powers
Congress further hamstrung the effort to investigate the financial crisis
by placing inordinate restrictions on the FCIC's use of its primary investigatory
tool-the subpoena. Pecora used the subpoena power Congress granted the
committee liberally in order to pry documents out of recalcitrant investment
banks. The lawyer had the power to do so because he only needed the
permission of the committee chairman to issue a subpoena. As the two chairmen
who oversaw the investigation, Peter Norbeck and Duncan Fletcher, wanted it to
be vigorous, this requirement presented few meaningful obstacles. When, for
example, financial institutions under investigation seemed to delay producing
documents requested by the Committee, Pecora did not hesitate to issue
subpoenas. 167
The original bill to create an independent commission to investigate the
financial crisis (S. 298), provided that the commission was authorized to issue
subpoenas, but placed no limits on its power to do S.168 Service of subpoenas
was by "any person designated by the Commission."' 69 The absence of any
limitation on issuing subpoenas combined with the delegation of authority for
service implied that the commission could by simple majority vote delegate
power to the staff director to issue subpoenas. This would have been much
closer to the power Pecora exercised. When the sponsors of S. 298 offered an
amendment to FERA creating a similar commission, the language regarding
subpoena power was substantially similar.170
The provisions regarding subpoena power changed substantially when
the bill went to the House of Representatives. The bill that passed the House on
May 6, 2009 now required that for the Commission to issue a subpoena it either
had to have the agreement of the chairman and vice-chairman or a vote by a
majority of the ten commissioners, including at least one member of the

66 See May, supra note 74, at 34.
67 See PERINO, supra note 5, at 88-94.
168 See S. 298, 1111h Cong., § 5(a)(2) (2009).
Id. at § 5(b).
70 155 CONG. REc. S4591 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009).
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minority.17 ' This provision was modeled on one contained in H.R. 74, an earlier
bill to create an independent commission that was offered by Republican Senator
Daryl Issa, who later proved to be a bitter critic of the FCIC.172 A similar
limitation on subpoena power appeared in the legislation that created the 9/11
Commission. That provision was inserted at the suggestion of the Bush
administration, and, of course, its primary concern was to weaken the
commission that it had originally opposed. 73
FERA retained this substantial limitation on the FCIC's subpoena
74
power.1 It was a cumbersome procedure and it made subpoenas highly unlikely
given the prevailing ethos in Washington that subpoenas are a last resort and not
a first step.' 75 Politicians, like Thomas Kean, view subpoenas as extraordinary
and potentially counterproductive.
A subpoena is something you hold out there and it's the big hammer.
If you use it too often, it loses its effectiveness. I thought its
effectiveness, in fact, was more in the threat of it than it was in the
actual use of it.' 76
Angelides shared this perspective, announcing early in the life of the
FCIC that he was "not eager" to use subpoenas and preferred "voluntary"
Lawyers serving on independent commissions often see
cooperation. 177
subpoenas differently-they are considered routine rather than hostile and
punitive.'
Ultimately, the limitations on the 9/11 Commission's subpoena power
were relatively unimportant for another reason. Some of the most critical
documents in the investigation-the intelligence briefings given to Presidents
Clinton and Bush and internal White House documents-were subject to claims
of executive privilege.17 9 The Bush administration, with its strong views of
executive power, could reasonably be expected to launch court challenges to
The 9/11 Commission faced a
subpoenas that sought these documents.
substantial risk that its investigation would get bogged down in lengthy legal
battles, battles the commission could very well lose. Even if it did prevail, the

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, S. 386, 11Ith Cong. § 5(d)(2)(B)(iii) (2009)
(citing the House passed Amendments to S. 386 on May 6, 2009).
172 H.R. 74, 111th Cong., § 6(a)(2)(A) (2009). See infra notes 193 through 197 and accompanying
text.
"7 LUNDBERG, supra note 96, at 3.
174 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(d)(2)(B)(iii), 123
Stat.
1617, 1625 (2009).
1s SHENON, supra note 60, at 93-94, 201-08.
176 id
177 Hirsch, supra note
14.
178 See LUNDBERG, supra note 96, at 33, 39-40 (referring to the views of 9/11 commissioners Jamie
Gorelick and Richard Ben-Veniste).
17 Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003) § 1.1 (a)(4) (stating that
information pertaining to "transnational terrorism" could be classified as national security
information).
17'
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commission might get access too late in order to meaningfully analyze those
documents. 80
Kean and Hamilton concluded that using subpoenas created too great a
risk of alienating the administration and destroying all potential for cooperation.
Their alternative strategy was to rely instead on the power of the bully pulpit.
When agencies delayed or defied complying with document requests, the chairs
held press conferences and issued interim reports to highlight these problems,
always firmly but diplomatically. Kean, fellow commissioner Jaime Gorelick
observed, "did not pop off, he was always gentlemanly, always courtly." Given
the commission's high profile and the political risks of appearing to obstruct its
investigation, jawboning was usually sufficient. It was only in a few cases of
outright refusal and obstruction that the 9/11 Commission resorted to issuing
subpoenas.' 8 1
As a result of the statutory and political restraints on subpoenas, it is not
surprising that Angelides announced his preference that firms voluntarily
cooperate with the probe. 182 He probably had little choice, but it proved to be
the wrong decision. Angelides was not primarily investigating government
agencies or the administration with their extreme sensitivities to subpoenas and
the threat that they could avoid compliance through claims of executive privilege.
He was investigating firms in the financial industry, which are subpoenaed on a
regular basis in governmental investigations and lawsuits. That distinction
should have been enough to counsel for a routine use of subpoenas. At the very
least, the FCIC could have used a bifurcated approach in which it subpoenaed
private firms and used document requests and moral suasion for governmental
actors. Without subpoenas, firms and their lawyers naturally sought to run out
the clock.
It was only when foot dragging grew excessive that the FCIC appeared
able to issue a subpoena, and even then it frequently met with obstruction. The
first subpoena was issued to Moody's Investors Service in April 2010, nearly a
year after the FCIC was formed and months after it held its first public hearing.18 3
The panel complained that the credit rating agency had been slow in responding
to its document requests.184 The most high profile incident occurred in June 2010
and involved Goldman Sachs. The firm had been stalling since January, failing
to provide specific answers to questions investigators had put to it and then
inundating the FCIC with five terabytes of information-the equivalent of
several billion pages of documents, none of it indexed. In this case, Angelides
did not follow the 9/11 Commission's diplomatic approach. "We did not ask
them to pull up a dump truck to our offices and dump a bunch of rubbish," he

180

KEAN & HAMILTON, supra note 58, at 64.

8"Id. at 29-34.
182 Greg Gordon

& Kevin G. Hall, Financial Crisis Panel is Ready to Play Hardball,Hous.

CHRON., Nov. 16, 2009, at 1.

Sewell Chan, Fiscal Panel Subpoenas Documents of Moody's, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2010, at
B6.
I84 Id.
183
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angrily complained.' 8 5 Even Vice Chairman Bill Thomas grumbled that
As the FCIC staff
Goldman's actions were "deliberate and disruptive.",8
struggled through the voluminous material, they soon discovered that many key
documents seemed to be missing. It was only in the face of those overtly
obstructionists tactics that the committee was finally able to agree to issue a
subpoena. "We're not going to let the American people be played for chumps
here," Angelides fumed. 87
After the subpoena, word was that Goldman was, at least initially, much
more cooperative. The firm immediately began to schedule interviews that had
long been delayed. When Goldman president Gary Cohen appeared before the
panel in July, he even apologized for the firm's earlier actions. But, as public
attention turned away from the story, the firm's contrition seemed to melt away.
Just a month later Angelides was again complaining about the slow pace with
which documents were being provided to the committee and about Goldman's
failure to provide specific responses to the panel's questions. And yet he resisted
issuing more subpoenas, the one action that had succeeded in getting the firm's
attention. "We've already asked Goldman for this information," he said. "I have
every expectation they'll comply. They've told us they will, I believe them. And
I'll believe them until they don't."' 88 This was after passage of Dodd-Frank and
after relations between Democratic and Republican members of FCIC had
Prospects for obtaining bipartisan agreement on a
already begun to sour.
subpoena were probably slim, so perhaps Angelides's only hope for compliance
was his expectations and beliefs. Pecora never needed to be so patient when it
came to wresting documents out of the targets of his investigation.
D. Political Interference with Independent Commissions
Political considerations and calculations are never far below the surface
of the work of independent commissions. Often politicians will try to directly
influence the work of those commissions. There were, for example, countless
cases of attempted political interference in the operations of the 9/11
Commission.190 Karl Rove, President Bush's chief political operative, made
frequent telephone calls to the investigation's chief of staff, Philip Zelikow,
apparently to keep tabs on the investigation. White House staff members, hoping
to destroy the credibility of Richard Clarke, a witness hostile to the
administration, helped to prepare questions for Republican commissioners. Then

185 Sewell Chan & Gretchen Morgenson, A Subpoenafor Goldman In Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 8,
2010, at Bl.
186 Id.
' Editorial, What is Goldman Hiding?, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 8, 2010, at A26.
181 Philip Angelides, Chairmanof the FinancialCrisis Inquiry Commission Talks
about Goldman
Sachs/AIG Investigation on Bloomberg TV, FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATORY WIRE, Aug. 5,
2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-05/angelides-says-fcic-to-keeppressing-goldman-for-data-video.html.
189S" Chan & Dash, supra note
20.
190 See SHENON, supra note 60, at 106-07, 267, 280, 325-33.
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attorney general John Ashcroft, in order to deflect criticism of his own failings in
the months before September 11, cast blame on Jamie Gorelick, a member of the
commission and a former high ranking Justice Department official in the Clinton
administration. Vice President Cheney even attempted to have the report rewritten to remove material he thought would be damaging to President Bush's reelection campaign.
Other than the Oversight Report, little has been revealed about the inner
workings of the FCIC. It will likely take years before we learn whether there
were similar behind the scenes attempts to influence the FCIC as occurred with
the 9/11 Commission. The FCIC records have been sent to the National Archives
and Records Administration and will not be open to public view until 2016.29
Careful review of those records and interviews with individuals connected with
the FCIC may reveal similar kinds of influence.
There were some overt steps. In April 2010, Angelides and Thomas
reportedly disagreed over whether to release preliminary staff reports and
documents produced to the FCIC in the investigation. When Angelides
suggested releasing the material, one report claims that Republicans threatened to
investigate the Commission if they took over the House in the mid-term
elections.1 92 The threat to investigate the investigators looked like an attempt to
quash disclosure.
The most prominent example of a member of Congress seeking to
discredit the FCIC involved Republican Representative Daryl Issa of California.
After passage of Dodd-Frank and while the FCIC's request for additional funding
was pending before Congress, Issa, then ranking member of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, dashed off a letter to
Angelides. In it he expressed his concern "that the FCIC's own problems with
financial mismanagement and partisanship may have resulted in a waste of
taxpayer funds that does not warrant an additional appropriation."l 9 3 Clearly,
Issa was more concerned about Democratic partisanship than Republican
partisanship. He discussed links between a commissioner and a staffer with a
plaintiffs' class action law firm and was "troubled by the extensive ties of some
of the senior staff at a putatively bipartisan commission to partisan Democrat
politics." 94 Issa then began to make the case that the FCIC's report was likely to
be a biased political document. "I am sure you will agree with me," he wrote
Angelides, "that the FCIC's efforts will have been wasted if the American people
come to believe that it has served as nothing more than a cheering section for the
Administration and congressional Democrats in their efforts to defend a partisan

See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Releases Additional Material and Concludes Work,
10, 2011) (noting that FCIC records at NARA
would be closed for five years), available at http://fcic-static.law.standford.edu/cdnmedia/feicnews/PressRelease_2. 10.11 .pdf.
192 Chan & Dash, supra note 20, at Bl.
193 Letter from Darrell Issa, Representative, United States Congress, to Phil Angelides, Chairman,
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (July 27, 2010), at 1.
' 94 Id. at 2-3.
1'
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and ineffective financial regulatory reform bill."l95 Issa demanded a raft of
documents from the FCIC, a request that Angelides dismissed as "silly, stupid
Washington stuff."196 Issa, however, was not deterred. After control of the
committee shifted to the Republicans and just weeks before the FCIC was set to
release its report, Issa announced that his committee would be investigating the
Commission.'97
This series of actions is typical for Washington politics, but ironic given
Issa's comments on the House floor when FERA was being debated. "As with
the 9/11 Commission," Issa argued, "the Financial Markets Commission report
should be free of accusations of political showmanship and a partisan slant that
have tainted current investigations. This Commission is not the place for
partisanship or Congressional meddling. It is a place for the American people to
get answers."l 98
IV. CONCLUSION
Government investigations come in all sorts of shapes and sizes. Some,
like the Pecora hearings, are innovative and path breaking, shaping laws and
regulations for decades. Although there was a good deal of loose talk about the
FCIC hearings replicating those results, the truth was that they never really had a
chance. The political climate in which they operated was far different, and far
too poisonous, to expect a dispassionate and searching inquiry into the causes of
the financial crisis. From the way that Congress structured the Commission and
from the limits placed on its investigatory tools, it should have been clear that the
FCIC had no chance of replicating the success of the Pecora hearings. Like the
9/11 Commission before it, the FCIC seemed to have been set up to fail. Only
the deft political touch of the 9/11 chairman kept that inquiry on track. The FCIC
was not similarly blessed.
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